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Abstract 
On 10 January 2011 the town of Grantham, Queensland (Australia) was inundated with a 
flash flood; 12 of the town’s 370 residents drowned. Grantham was one of more than 70 
communities and 200,000 people in Queensland affected by flooding in December 2010 
and January 2011. More than three-quarters of Queensland was declared a flood disaster 
zone, there were 35 deaths, and the overall costs were $AUD2.38 billion ($USD2.4 
billion). After extensive consultation with the community, a decision was made to 
relocate the town in March 2011. We focus on the unusual and even rare decision to 
relocate Grantham. The Lockyer Valley Regional Council (LVRC) SOMEBODY 
acquired a 377-hectare (932 acres) site to enable a voluntary swap of equivalent-sized 
lots. In addition planning regulations were set aside to streamline the relocation of a 
portion of the town. We review the natural hazard literature on community relocation, 
state and local government documents on Grantham, and reports and newspaper articles 
about the flood. We compliment these reviews with interviews of key stakeholders. We 
document the process of community relocation, assess the relocation process in Grantham 
against best practice, question whether the process of community relocation is scalable, 
and examine whether the Grantham relocation is an example of good planning or good 
politics.  AND—what did you find? Just the messages for practice or interim findings 
that led to the practice messages?   
Key messages for practice; We believe that community relocation (albeit a small one) is 
possible and can be done quickly—some Grantham residents moved into their new 
relocated homes in December 2012 – 11 months after the flood. We also conclude that 
existing planning regulations can be a hindrance to quick action while political 
leadership, particularly at the local level, is key to implementing the relocation.  
 
Introduction 
Relocation of communities is often discussed in disaster planning literature, but 
it is rare that such relocations ever occur. This paper examines the case of a small 
flood-affected community in Australia, Grantham, Queensland. In early January 2011 it 
was inundated by a flash flood that killed 12 of the town’s 370 residents. Grantham was 
one of more than 70 communities and 200,000 people in the state that were affected by 
flooding between December 2010 and January 2011. In the state 35 people died as a 
result of these floods and the damage bill was $AUD2. 38 billion ($USD 2.4 billion). 
More than three-quarters of the state, an area of 1.27 million square kilometres 
(equivalent to the combined area of Texas and California), was declared a flood 
disaster zone by the Australian and Queensland Government under joint arrangements.  
The focus of this paper is not on the impacts of these floods in Queensland, but 
instead on the decision and process of relocating Grantham, one of the many flood-
affected communities. The paper has four goals to: 1) examine in detail why and how 
Grantham was relocated; 2) see the extent to which the Grantham relocation compared to 
best practice based on the literature; 3) assess whether this process could be replicated 
for other similarly sized communities and expanded in scale for larger ones; and 4) 
answer the question of whether the Grantham relocation was an example of best practice 
disaster planning or good politics.  
Understanding Community Relocation 
 
The literature on community relocation, while growing, is relatively small.  The 
literature can be grouped into two overlapping categories: 1) reports of the specific 
experiences and lessons learned by planning and relocating communities; and 2) a much 
smaller body of literature that synthesizes experiences across multiple contexts into 
factors, principles and toolkits to guide future relocation efforts.  In this section, we 
overview the experiential findings and normative guidelines which we then synthesise 
into an emerging approach for community relocation.  
Experiences with Community Relocation 
The experiential literature on community relocation addressed four issues: 1) 
communities either fully or partly relocated in response to flooding (David and Mayer, 
1984, Perry and Lindell, 1997, FEMA, 2005) and natural disasters (FEMA, 2005, Imura 
and Shaw, 2009); 2) community relocation, both planned and actual, in response to the 
impacts of mining (Shriver and Kennedy, 2005, Nilsson, 2010); 3) climigration, that is, 
planned retreat in response to the hazards of climate change (Bronen and Chapin, 2013, 
Niven and Bardsley, 2013, Abel et al., 2011); and 4) group migration of refugees and 
repatriation, both voluntary and involuntary (Zaloznaya and Gerber, 2012). 
The first three types of community relocation are directly relevant to the 
objectives of this paper and are therefore our focus.  Most of this literature covers 
experiences in the U.S. with some research from Europe, Australia, and Asia. These case 
studies target a mix of community and government led approaches and a mix of 
outcomes:, success in community relocation, as reported in this literature, is varied.  
Despite the small body of literature, the experiences and findings across studies are 
complementary and it is possible to identify some key community relocation themes.  
Problems with the Relocation Process 
The process of community relocation is often fraught with problems and 
challenges. The process itself varies across contexts according to: the urgency and 
severity of the pressure(s) on communities to relocate, the level of citizen involvement in 
the decision to relocate, the degree of local and external leadership, involvement and 
agency in community relocation and institutional frameworks for disaster recovery and 
development planning.  These factors affect local decision-making and the order in which 
the necessary steps occur in the relocation process (e.g., gaining local approval, 
purchasing land, developing land, transitioning to/from temporary/permanent housing) 
(Bronen and Chapin, 2013, Perry and Lindell, 1997, Oliver-Smith, 1991, Wu and Lindell, 
2004).    
Specific problems and challenges arising in the relocation process can include:  
 Choosing the right resettlement site.  This is critical to the success or failure 
of relocation (Imura and Shaw, 2009, Oliver-Smith, 1991).  Resettlement sites 
need to be hazard free; however finding the right land in the right location can 
be difficult (Imura and Shaw, 2009).  Sites that are too far away from the 
original community can cause economic and social problems if employment, 
family, social networks, cultural and lifestyle characteristics are too distant 
(Imura and Shaw, 2009, Nilsson, 2010, Oliver-Smith, 1991).  Relocating a 
single-interest community where everyone is dependent on a main industry 
can be a major ideological and financial challenge (Nilsson, 2010). 
 Costs of relocating and obtaining resources.  This includes the cost of 
payouts, buybacks, and developing new property (Niven and Bardsley, 2013).  
In Newtok, Alaska, the local community was able to secure resources for 
some aspects of the relocation, for example to build housing. They were not, 
however, able to secure funds for critical infrastructure to support community 
relocation.  Consequently the community has not been able to relocate 
(Bronen and Chapin, 2013). In Kiruna, Sweden, iron extraction is 
undermining the current town center and ten percent of the community is 
relocating, however the overall relocation costs have been difficult to 
determine (Nilsson, 2010).  
 Timing and length of time involved in the community relocation. 
Allenville, Arizona, is a small close-knit community of less than fifty 
households devastated by recurrent flooding from water releases in upstream 
reservoirs during the 1980s. Residents had to wait years after moving their 
possessions before they could actually relocate (Perry and Lindell, 1997).  
This is problematic because most analysts report that the best time to 
implement community relocation is immediately after the disaster (Wu and 
Lindell, 2004, Imura and Shaw, 2009).   
 Long impact of short term decisions. Decisions made immediately after a 
disaster can have long-term repercussions.  Some examples include: the 
location of temporary housing/businesses; where spoil (waste material created 
by excavation or dredging) is dumped; road closures and openings; restoration 
of critical infrastructure; and resettlement of houses (FEMA, 2005). 
 Managing social issues during relocation.  When Allenville (AZ) was 
relocated, key issues to be managed included: “keeping the community 
together during the wait for relocation; addressing problems of 
communication and rumour control; maintaining commitment to relocation; 
and handling opposition to relocation by citizens of surrounding 
communities.” (Perry and Lindell, 1997, p. 50). 
Community Willingness to Relocate 
Divisiveness about relocation is a key theme in the literature; it can cause significant 
problems for communities and governments in creating and implementing relocation 
plans.  Communities, particularly those subject to buyouts and relocation, can be 
splintered over: the perception of risk and harm (Shriver and Kennedy, 2005); economic 
concerns (e.g., loss of jobs, buyouts, broader economic issues (such as lowered property 
values) (Shriver and Kennedy, 2005); perspectives on the public and private benefits and 
costs involved in relocating (Abel et al., 2011); and attachment to community which 
impacts on the willingness to relocate (Shriver and Kennedy, 2005,.Adger et al., 2013).  
Whether the migration process is managed as a forced versus voluntary process is 
also significant for community willingness to relocate (Oliver-Smith, 1991, Imura and 
Shaw, 2009).  Some feel powerless when they are forced to move; they may also be 
concerned about compensation for their houses (Nilsson, 2010). When relocation is 
voluntary, not all not all community members will resettle together (Perry and Lindell, 
1997). Some people return to the original site, even after resettlement (Oliver-Smith, 
1991).  
Governance, Leadership, and Community Involvement 
Governance, leadership, and community involvement are important interrelated 
themes.  First, the literature highlights governance problems including a lack of 
institutional frameworks and agencies with the authority to relocate community 
infrastructure and rebuild livelihoods (Bronen and Chapin, 2013; Abel et al., 2011). 
Scholars cite institutional barriers to relocation which makes it easier to fund mitigation 
than relocation (David and Mayer, 1984).  In the case of Intok, Alaska, the absence of 
clear criteria and guidelines for funding and site selection delayed the process (Bronen 
and Chapin, 2013).  For example, improving planning tools to fast track development 
applications, building permits, approvals for the demolition of buildings, zoning for 
temporary housing, as well as re-establishing services, access and transportation, etc. 
(FEMA, 2005).  Bronen and Chapin (2013) argue that climate induced displacement 
needs flexible and dynamic governance structures. 
Second, in terms of leadership, strong local leadership is needed to foster innovation 
and communication across decision-making scales.  This is needed to overcome 
governance and institutional barriers in complex and polycentric decision-making where 
many stakeholders (local, state and national governments, financial institutions, 
community-based organisations etc) and governance domains (e.g., land development; 
infrastructure provision; disaster response; land titling, insurance and finance etc) are 
involved (Bronen and Chapin, 2013, Imura and Shaw, 2009).  Strong local leaders 
championed by a journalist, the village board and a community development planner 
drove the relocation of the Soldiers Gove, Wisconsin downtown (David and Mayer, 
1984).  
Third the need to involve all community members and stakeholders affected by the 
community relocation in the decision-making process is a consistently strong theme in 
the literature (FEMA, 2005; Imura and Shaw, 2009; IFC, 2002).  When community 
relocation fails, it is often due to a lack of consultation with affected communities 
(Oliver-Smith, 1991).   
Relocation Benefits 
There is less written about the benefits of relocation because of the few successful 
examples of community relocation.  Nevertheless, it is an emerging theme with two 
elements: benefits to individuals due to relocating to safer land; and direct social, 
economic and environmental co-benefits that can be achieved as outcomes through the 
process.  In Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, four municipal offices, about thirty commercial 
structures, two groups of upper-story apartments and nine houses were relocated on a 8.1 
hectare (20 acres) site north of the river.  But there were other co-benefits as the river 
corridor was developed into a park, residents’ houses were built to higher standards of 
thermal efficacy and solar energy, local labor and local services were used in the 
relocation which had had local economic benefits (e.g., new businesses were established, 
population in migration) and property values increased (David and Mayer, 1984).  While 
there are a range of issues to overcome, community relocation can be positive (Imura and 
Shaw, 2009).  
Factors, principles, and toolkits to guide relocation efforts 
We now turn our attention to normative recommendations which have emerged in the 
literature to guide future relocation efforts.  Four frameworks of factors, principles, and 
toolkits for community relocation were identified: Perry and Lindall 1997, Imura and 
Shaw 1997, IFA 2002 and Bronen and Chapin 2013. Perry and Lindell (1997) identify six 
principles for positive resettlement. They emphasize that local community organizations 
should play a key role, that local relocatees and citizens should understand the 
complexities involved and participate in the decision making process.  Furthermore the 
social and personal needs of relocatees needs to be addressed, social networks preserved 
and cultural, racial and economic minority concerns considered (Perry and Lindell, 
1997). Similarly, Imura and Shaw (2009) identify factors for successful resettlement. 
They also emphasize that affected communities need to be involved in resettlement and 
the need to pay attention to social and economic needs and preserve social networks. 
Moreover, the social and economic suitability of the relocation, the availability and 
proximity of basic infrastructure, the ability of affected populations to bring items of 
personal significance and maintaining similarity in housing design and layout is 
important (Imura and Shaw, 2009). The International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2002) 
identifies data that should be used to identify who needs to be relocated and how much 
they should be compensated.  Finally, Bronen and Chapin (2013) provide a toolkit of 
strategies which emphasise local leadership and integration of and social-ecological well-
being in community relocation.  
We have combined the four aforementioned guidelines to produce a synthetic list 
of practices that the literature suggests community relocation needs in order to be 
successful.  However some of the key lessons from the experience of community 
relocation that we reviewed earlier were not adequately captured, namely: the need for 
collaboration across and within decision-making scales to manage community relocation 
processes; and the need for strong and rapid commitment to the relocation vision and 
rationale and its implementation by chief decision makers at all relevant tiers of 
government.  We have added these such that the approach presented in Table 1 combines 
data from both the normative ‘guidelines’ and the experiential literature on community 
relocation to produce a list of suggested practices for community relocation.  We have 
organized into two groups – one focused on process and the other on planning.   
[Insert Table 1 here – An Emerging Approach for Community Relocation] 
 
Research methods  
As the literature shows, community relocation is often discussed in disaster 
planning literature, but it is rare that such relocations ever occur.  In the case of 
Grantham, the community was relocated quickly —some Grantham residents moved 
into their new relocated homes in December 2012 – 11 months after the flood.  We 
examine the decision and process of relocating the community to inform future practice.  
Our aims are to: 1) examine in detail why and how Grantham was relocated; 2) see the 
extent to which the Grantham relocation compared to best practice based on the 
literature; 3) assess whether this process could be replicated for other similarly sized 
communities and expanded in scale for larger ones; and 4) answer the question of 
whether the Grantham relocation was an example of best practice disaster planning or 
good politics.  
Our research methods involved the following steps: 1) the natural hazard 
literature related to community relocation was reviewed to identify emerging best 
practices for community relocation; 2) the Queensland Reconstruction Authority 
(QRA), the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI) and the Lockyer Valley 
Regional Council (LVRC) documents and other documents (primarily reports and 
newspaper reporting) related to the overall flood and Grantham were reviewed to build 
a picture of the relocation itself including how and why Grantham was relocated; and 3) 
six open ended interviews (face-to-face and telephone) were conducted with key 
individuals involved in planning and implementing the relocation at the state and local 
level.  The questions explored included: 
 the roles of the participants in relation to the Strengthening Grantham Project;  
 what happened prior to, during and after the flood in terms of safeguarding 
Grantham; 
 the institutional arrangements pertaining to planning, delivery and 
implementation of the Strengthening Grantham Project;  
 what proposed changes are being considered to better prepare for and respond in 
future flooding events; and 
 what can planners elsewhere learn from the Grantham relocation experience? 
This allowed critical success factors at Grantham to be identified; and 4) data from 
the relocation experience at Grantham (interviews and reports) was then considered 
against the best practice framework to identify whether or not the approach at 
Grantham matched the emerging approach for community relocation or and was 
able to add to the knowledge base about successful relocation.   
The focus of this research was on the institutional and planning mechanisms that enabled 
the Grantham relocation to be planned and implemented under tight time constraints.  
This study was limited in that it did not include a post-occupancy analysis of resident 
experiences during and after the relocation.  Although beyond this scope of work, it 
would add another dimension to the evaluation of the success of the relocation and would 
be a useful avenue of further research. 
The Grantham Case Study  
     
Grantham is a community in the Lockyer Valley Regional Council, a rural 
agricultural area.  It is approximately 100 kilometres (62.1 miles) west of Brisbane, the 
state capital of Queensland. The LVRC has a population of 37,000 and a land area of 
2,272 square kilometres (877.2 square miles) making it slightly smaller than the land area 
of Rhode Island. Most residents (96.4 percent) live in private dwellings, mostly single 
detached houses.  Most homes are owned (entirely or with a mortgage, higher than the 
average 63.5% across Queensland. Most people are employed in small businesses with 
fewer than four employees. While Grantham has a lower unemployment rate than the 
state as a whole (3.9% versus 5.9%), Lockyer Valley has one of the highest levels of 
socio-economic disadvantage (based on indicators of income, education and health) in the 
region (Queensland Statistician, 2014). 
On the afternoon of 10 January 2011 Grantham was hit by a flash flood. The 
impact was so great that it became known in the media as an “inland tsunami” (Coates, 
2012) or a wall of water estimated to be between six and seven metres high and moving 
at great speed. Twelve of the town’s population of 370 were killed. Many of the buildings 
in the town were damaged. We estimate there were about 137 dwelling units at the time 
of the flood (based on a population of 370 and an average household size in the Lockyer 
Valley Regional Council of 2.7 persons/household).  Approximately 130 homes, 
representing 87 percent of the total housing stock, were damaged in Grantham; ten were 
destroyed and another 19 were damaged beyond repair (Lockyer Valley Regional 
Council 2011) 
While Grantham was the hardest hit community in the LVRC, the entire council 
area was impacted. Overall, 19 people were killed, 2,290 buildings were flooded of 
which 119 suffered structural damage. More than 1,000 motor vehicles were swept away 
and more than 1,000 kilometres (621.4 miles) of council roads were damaged – 
representing 77 percent of all council roads – needing $AUD 204.6 million ($USD 206.4 
million) to repair (Lockyer Valley Regional Council, 2011). 
[Insert Figure 1 (Grantham map) about here] 
The events in Grantham (and the Lockyer Valley) need to be put into context of 
the continental weather in 2010/1. 1The Australian continent was under the influence of 
the strongest La Nina weather pattern since records have been kept dating back to the late 
1800s, thus making 2010 Australia’s second wettest year on record. As a result three-
quarters of the state was declared a flood disaster area by the Australian and Queensland 
Governments in early January 2011. The total damage and losses reached an estimated 
$AUD 15.9 billion ($USD16.0 billion) which is larger than the total damage and loss of 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami ($11 billion) and on par with the 2002 Elbe flooding in 
Germany ($14.2 billion) (QRA and World Bank, 2011).  
This was the most serious flood in Grantham’s history, but it was not the first. 
Grantham was built in a flood plain and has repeatedly flooded over the past 150 years, 
beginning in 1863 and continuing in 1864, 1887, 1889, 1890, 1959, 1974, 1983, 1999 and 
2011.  (Queensland Statistician, 2014) 
Grantham’s Relocation 
In March 2011 a decision was made by the LVRC to relocate the flood affected 
portion of Grantham.  Council acquired a 377-hectare (932 acres) site to enable a 
voluntary swap of equivalent-sized lots and planning regulations were set aside to 
streamline the relocation of a portion of the town. Figure 2 summarizes what happened 
in Grantham after the flood and when. The left side of the Figure shows the major flood 
events during the past 150 years while on the right is a timeline of key events during 
2011. Where possible we have provided exact dates.  
[Insert Figure 2 (timeline) about here] 
 We highlight some aspects of the relocation process rather than describing each 
step in the process. First is the speed with which this happened – only eleven months 
elapsed between the flood (10 January) and when the first family occupied their new 
home in the relocation area (10 December). Our interviews confirmed that having flood-
affected families in their new homes within a year of the flood was a key driving factor 
in the process.  
While there are many factors that helped speed up this process, we believe there 
are two key factors. The first factor was the leadership provided by the LVRC and it’s 
mayor, Steve Jones. The idea of relocating portions of Grantham was first raised with the 
public in the LVRC Community Recovery Plan (dated 23 February 2011).  One of the 
actions in the plan was to: “Investigate sites at Grantham and other affected communities 
for safe rebuilding, in conjunction with the Queensland Reconstruction Authority”.  The 
idea of the land swap was an idea first raised by Steve Jones. The area that would 
ultimately become the “relocated Grantham” was identified by LVRC within days of the 
flood.  An online search showed that the property was for sale; however when the owner 
was contacted he advised that it was no longer on the market and the listing should have 
been removed from the web. Negotiations to purchase the property proceeded at that 
point. The property had not previously been earmarked for development because it was 
outside the “urban footprint” as designated by the statutory South East Queensland 
Regional Plan and such residential would have been prohibited.  
Initially the community was intrigued with the land swap idea, but many thought 
it was too good to be true. Through weekly workshops run by the LVRC, as well as with 
one-on-one meetings between case managers and affected property owners, the 
community became convinced that the land swap would actual occur. 
One month later on 23 March, the LVRC made the decision to relocate the flood-
affected portions of Grantham through its decision to purchase 377 hectares using LVRC 
funds. As Figure 1 shows, the relocation site was almost contiguous to the existing 
Grantham community. The LRVC began to develop the site before they had any 
contributions from the state and federal government. The state and federal government 
ultimately provided approximately $16.7 million for roads, drainage, and other site 
infrastructure improvements.   
The second factor that speeded up the relocation was that the state streamlined 
the planning regulations for the Grantham reconstruction area. What would normally 
have taken two to three years to plan and permit was accomplished in four months. It 
was possible to streamline the process because Grantham was so rapidly designated as a 
reconstruction area by the Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA) – the LVRC 
made the request on 23 March and on 8 April it was so designated. The QRA was itself 
established by the Queensland government on 21 February year? to help expedite and 
coordinate reconstruction efforts across the state. 
 Some of the steps in the timeline happened out of the normal order. For example, 
the LVRC made the decision to buy a 377-hectare site in March prior to the designation 
of the Grantham reconstruction area or the approval of the new development plan. 
Another example is that on June 7, the LVRC Mayor Steve Jones and the Queensland 
Premier Anna Bligh broke ground to begin site preparations for the new Grantham, but 
the redevelopment plan did not get approved until 4 August – almost two months later. 
Under normal conditions neither of these “out of sequence” events would have occurred. 
 Another point apparent from the timeline is the level of community involvement. 
In February the LVRC began community consultations for the master planning exercise, 
which was followed by a community visioning meeting on 19 March and a design 
options workshop on 26 March. The land swap program was introduced to the 
community on 13 July and the first ballot was held on 6 August. Not shown on the 
timeline is the fact that the first Grantham newsletter was published by the LVRC on 15 
January – five days after the flood and those newsletters continued throughout the 
relocation process. 
One of the key (and unique) features of the Grantham relocation was a land swap 
program. The overall program involved four stages: resident eligibility (through a ballot 
process); development and funding of the new site; assignment to residents of rights to 
the new site; and resident financing of their construction.  
The LVRC decided that a ballot system was the fairest way to decide who would 
be able to participate in what?. To be eligible, property owners had to have experienced 
the following:  (1) complete destruction of their house; and/or (2) the remains of their 
house was deemed unsafe, uninhabitable or not fit for habitation and only suitable for 
demolition; and/or (3) the property value of the house was assumed to have been 
destroyed and was unsalable as a dwelling fit for habitation; and/or (4) homes and land 
were located in the area identified in Map A of the Grantham Relocation Policy 
document. 
To provide independence to the process, the ballot was administered by URBIS, 
an independent consultancy based in Australia. The ballot was held in August and 100 
property owners were successful. The relocation area (see the map in Figure 2) comprised 
two areas: Stage 1 which has 90 lots ranging in size from 1,000-10,000m2; and Stage 2 
which will be developed once Stage 1 is fully occupied.  Part of the land swap involved 
the LVRC taking ownership of flood-affected parcels to insure that they would not be 
developed in the future.  
The Commonwealth (national) government provided 47.5% of the funding for 
recovery and reconstruction  across the state; the Queensland (state) government 
provided 17.8%, insurance a little under 30%, and private donations a little over 5% of 
available funds—but that only accounted for about 75 percent of the damage (QRA and 
World Bank, 2011).  This is substantially higher than the international standard for 
developed countries of about 45 percent (World Bank 2011). Most of this funding was 
used to replace key infrastructure.  Household reconstruction costs were largely met 
through insurance payments; private donations, via non profits, were used for one-time 
grants to uninsured or under-insured residents whose eligibility was income tested.  
To assist in the relocation process, participating property owners were able to 
apply for a $32,550 grant made available by the state of Queensland to defray moving 
costs, connection to utilities and services, construction of a house pad and drainage, etc. 
As a result of these efforts, the first families occupied their new homes in the relocation 
area eleven months after the flood event. Figures 3 and 4 provide photographs of some of 
the new and relocated homes in the “new” Grantham. 
Finally the LVRC provided caseworkers to help those wishing to relocate and 
participate in the land swap program who faced a range of mortgage and insurance 
problems. The caseworkers were originally LVRC volunteers, but when the workload 
became too great, dedicated caseworkers were employed.  
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 (photos) about here] 
Did Grantham Use Best Practices? 
 
We assessed whether the Grantham relocation achieved each of the 13 best 
practice principles described in Table 1 which provided our rationale for the assessment.  
The results of this analysis, provided in Table 2, show that the process used in Grantham 
met all 13 of the best practice principles. Really? That’s all you are going to say about 
this?  The case study is your original contribution and is what should fill most of the 
article.  Anybody can read the literature.  You should expand this section considerably—
if for no other reason that you cannot let a Table do your work for you.  A table should be 
a summary of what you explain to the reader in the body of the paper—definitely not the 
other way around. This is totally unacceptable—if you don’t care enough about your own 
findings and analyses to even discuss them-and they are your original contribution—
what’s the point of this paper? 
 
[Insert Table 2 (Grantham Assessment) about here] 
In addition to meeting best practice principles as defined in the literature, our 
interviews of the key stakeholders identified a number of other principles that were 
important contributors to the relocation success -- and not addressed in the relocation 
literature. The first of these was effectively engaging the media, which differs from the 
community engagement routinely addressed in the relocation literature. The LVRC 
realized early on that managing both print and broadcast media was important and would 
be very helpful in achieving their relocation goals. For their media efforts they received 
the “Best Advocacy Communications Award” in 2011 from Government 
Communications Australia. 
 The second principle that SOMEBODY followed not discussed in the literature 
was a planning approach that involved a small highly connected team making decisions 
rapidly. The team including only six members, four from the LVRC including the Mayor, 
the CEO, a manager with some planning and environmental engineering experience and a 
project coordinator, along with a consulting planner and engineer. While none of the four 
LVRC staff were trained as planners, they did have the services of a planning consultant 
for some aspects of the relocation. The small team approach meant that it was easy to 
schedule meetings and coordinate activities.  
 A third principle followed by SOMEBODY not discussed in the literature 
involved rapidly moving to important decisions. The LVRC acted quickly to begin 
discussions about relocation because they felt that it was important to create some 
momentum and focus the community after the initial rescue and recovery was completed. 
Having undeveloped, flood free, and available land in close proximity to the flooded 
areas facilitated this quick action. A common pitfall of relocation efforts is that the “new” 
site is not close to the existing community, which disrupts livelihoods, social networks, etc. 
By moving quickly there were opportunities for corporations and the community to add 
value into the development while the crisis was fresh. They donated services to help 
people manage the complex legal, banking, and insurance issues associated with the land 
swap. For example, a local law firm handled all the property conveyancing for the land 
swap program. The (mysterious somebody) also provided goods to help residents build 
and furnish their new homes.  
By working quickly, the LVRC was able to kept costs down which allowed land 
to be developed to higher standards than what had existed in older parts of Grantham.  
The new area had curbs and gutters, wider roads, sewerage and park/recreation spaces 
equipped with public BBQs, seating, play equipment and a fruit grove.  These higher 
standards, combined with the fact that the property was no longer flood affected, resulted 
in much higher land values. This created an additional financial incentive to landholders 
who were initially unsure about taking up the land swap offer.  
LVRC ground crew worked seven days a week on the development site and were 
proud to donate their time to help rebuild their community. The rapid process also helped 
to maintain media and community interest in supporting the relocation.   
 
 The final principle (and again not found in the relocation literature) was the 
willingness of the LVRC to take risks. The relocation was more than a simple planning 
exercise and needed “whole of council” support, particularly from the LVRC Mayor and 
CEO. Given that community relocations are rare means that almost no one has any 
relevant experience. This suggests that much could go wrong and most council CEOs 
would not agree to such an undertaking. 
Conclusions 
This case provides four key messages for planning practice. They include: 1) 
community relocation (albeit a small one) is possible under the right conditions 
including having nearby land available; 2) the process can be done quickly-- some 
Grantham residents moved into their relocated homes less than a year after the flood 
event; 3) existing planning regulations can be a hindrance to quick action; and 4) 
political leadership, particularly at the local level, was key to implementing the 
relocation. However these key messages need to be considered in light of the 
contextual and institutional differences that exist between countries. 
One of the goals of this paper was to assess whether the Grantham relocation process 
could be replicated in other small communities, particularly larger communities. Under 
the right conditions it might be possible. However it is not likely unless the following 
conditions exist—which may be necessary but not sufficient.  First there must be local 
political leadership, because without local government buy-in, such initiatives would 
most likely fail. Second, the local government manager or CEO must be committed to the 
relocation because such an endeavor requires a whole of government approach – it is 
much greater than just a planning initiative. The QFCI addressed this question and 
reached the following conclusions: 
“Whether other councils are able to implement a land swap program 
similar to the Lockyer Valley Regional Council’s program, in isolation or 
together with zoning controls, and whether it would be appropriate for 
them to do so, will depend on the circumstances they face. Relevant 
matters include views of the community, the availability of close, 
undeveloped and unconstrained land, council’s financial resources and 
whether floodplain management principles justify restricting 
development of the land within the floodplain. The success of the 
Grantham project, however, provides a template for a response to 
floodplain management, which other councils in similar circumstances 
may wish to adopt”. (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012, 
pg. 277) 
Another of this paper’s goals was to address the question of whether the 
Grantham’s relocation illustrated good planning or good politics. Our view is that it was 
both. There was an aspect of political motivation, because why else would the state and 
federal government be involved in helping a community with only 370 residents, 
particularly given the widespread flooding conditions in Queensland and the large 
number of people affected. From a state and federal perspective this didn’t make much 
sense. Even within South East Queensland, there were other more serious issues, 
however the state was happy go along with the relocation because it was a “good news” 
story and helped to divert attention away from other areas. Their actual involvement in 
the planning and implementation appeared to follow the efforts of the local government.  
The Grantham relocation exemplifies good planning. Grantham had been 
repeatedly flooded over the years but prior to the 2011 flood there had been relatively 
large loss of life in this event with three percent (12 of 370) of the town’s residents dying. 
Besides good planning, it also illustrated good government -- it showed that local 
government could act quickly and decisively and gave residents something to focus on – 
not just rebuilding, but rebuilding in flood-free areas. 
This case study provides a starting point to consider the range of factors that 
enable successful community relocation.  The research was limited to understanding 
the institutional and planning factors that enabled the Grantham relocation to occur.  
However, our research recognizes further research opportunities in Grantham to 
inform relocation planning, including: 
 a post-occupancy analysis to provide additional perspectives on the 
success of the relocation;  
 an assessment of community human wellbeing, dysfunction, and stability 
over time; and 
 a governance systems analysis to identify success factors and lessons for 
community relocation planning.   
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Table 1. An Emerging Approach for Community Relocation from the Literature 
(Partially based on Bronen and Chapin, 2013, IFC, 2002, Imura and Shaw, 2009, Perry and Lindell, 1997) 
 
Managing the Relocation Process 
 One local community organization leads resettlement efforts and other agencies 
involved in relocations have a local site office/presence (Perry and Lindell, 1997, 
Imura and Shaw, 2009) 
 Affected communities/relocatees participate in critical resettlement and 
implementation decisions, (e.g., site selection, identification of basic needs, 
settlement planning, housing designs and implementation) (Perry and Lindell, 
1997)  
 Citizens understand the organizational complexity of the relocation and have 
points of contact for each agency involved (Perry and Lindell, 1997). 
 Special concerns with regard to cultural, racial and economic minority issues are 
addressed so that people do not feel discriminated against (Perry and Lindell, 
1997) 
 Stakeholders and agencies work collaboratively across and within scales to 
streamline planning and development processes, manage relocation tasks, and 
resolve issues. (Added by the authors, but based on our review of the literature) 
 
Planning the relocation 
 The number of people affected and their location is enumerated and registered so 
that the size and scale of the resettlement planning can be estimated (IFC, 2002) 
 An inventory of lost and affected assets at the household, enterprise, and 
community level is compiled and affected people are consulted to develop a 
reasonable consensus on the methods and formulas for assigning value to lost 
assets and income forgone (IFC, 2002) 
 Basic infrastructure services are available (Imura and Shaw, 2009) 
 Relocation is socially and economically suitable (Imura and Shaw, 2009) 
 The social and personal needs of the relocated are addressed and social networks 
are preserved (Perry and Lindell, 1997, Imura and Shaw, 2009) 
 Housing designs, settlement layouts, natural habitat, and community facilities 
match a community’s way of life (Imura and Shaw, 2009) 
 People are able to bring items of high emotional, spiritual, or cultural value 
(Imura and Shaw, 2009) 
 Commitment to relocation, the vision and rationale is set soon after the disaster, 
is time-bound, and strongly supported by the chief decision makers at all relevant 
tiers of government. (Added by the authors, but based on our review of the 
literature) 
 
  
Table 2. Assessment of Grantham’s Relocation 
(based on Best Practice Principles from Table 1) 
 
Principle Achieved Basis for the Assessment 
Managing the process   
1. One local community organization 
leads resettlement efforts and other 
agencies involved in the relocation 
have a local presence (Imura & 
Shaw, 2009; Perry & Lindell, 
1997) 
Yes The LVRC was the face of the resettlement of 
Grantham. The QRA had a local presence as the 
face of the Queensland Government and 
undertook behind the scenes coordination and 
liaison with other state agencies to fast-track the 
planning process (QRA & World Bank, 2011; 
Simmonds & Davies, 2011).  
2. Affected communities/relocatees 
participate in resettlement and 
implementation decisions (e.g., 
site selection, identification of 
basic needs, settlement planning, 
housing designs and 
implementation) (Perry & Lindell, 
1997) 
Yes Extensive community consultation occurred very 
early on in the process led by the LVRC with 
later involvement of the QRA.  Affected 
residents were informed and involved in 
planning and decision-making (Simmonds & 
Davies, 2011).   
3. Relocatees are informed about the 
progress of relocation and have 
points of contact for key agencies 
involved.  Communication is 
sympathetic to the issues 
confronting stakeholders and is 
two-way. 
Yes The LVRC distributed regular newsletters and 
held nightly/weekly community meetings with 
affected residents to hear their concerns and keep 
them informed about relocation efforts 
(Simmonds & Davies, 2011). 
4. Special concerns with regard to 
cultural, racial and economic 
minority issues are addressed so 
that people do not feel 
discriminated against (Perry & 
Lindell, 1997) 
Yes Community engagement and planning was 
careful to ensure that residents with special needs 
were appropriately included and their needs 
addressed through the process (Simmonds & 
Davies, 2011). 
5. Stakeholders and agencies work 
collaboratively across and within 
scales to streamline planning and 
development processes, manage 
relocation tasks, and resolve 
issues. 
Yes Stakeholders and agencies at different levels 
from local through to federal government each 
had their own role to play to achieve the goal of 
having people in their new homes by Christmas.  
While there were conflicts, primarily between 
the different levels of government, the 
collaborative efforts were ultimately successful. 
Planning the relocation   
6. The size of the resettlement task is 
estimated (spatially, 
economically, socially, 
institutionally) (IFC, 2002) (IFC, 
2002)  
Yes The goal was the starting point to estimate what 
needed to happen and by when.  Decision 
making about Grantham received special 
treatment by government--processes that would 
take years to complete were done in days. Two 
small teams (one led by the LVRC focusing on 
the relocation, the other led by QRA focused on 
State Government Coordination) estimated and 
planned what needed to happen, by when and 
whom (Simmonds & Davies, 2011). Short 
timeframes meant that the needs assessments and 
financial estimates were developed quickly using 
rapid appraisal approaches, but were accurate 
enough to enable detailed relocation planning 
and to secure federal and state investment (QRA 
& World Bank, 2011).  Speed meant no time for 
lengthy studies, planning or design, but 
unanimous agreement that this did not 
compromise the quality.  Collaborative processes 
helped to manage issues and achieve good 
outcomes under tight timeframes while keeping 
costs down (QRA & World Bank, 2011). 
7. Affected people are consulted to 
define the methods to assign value 
to lost assets, compensation 
parameters, asset swaps and 
baseline monitoring indicators 
(IFA, 2002) 
Yes Assigning value to lost assets (and 
compensation) are not relevant because of the 
“land swap” process used in Grantham 
(Simmonds & Davies, 2011). However an 
important related element in Grantham was the 
amount of money available – 75% of the rebuild 
costs compared with the 45% recommended 
international standard. The additional 
investment, not just in bricks, mortar and 
infrastructure, but in local businesses gave 
employment to people whose businesses would 
have suffered after the disaster. 
8. Basic infrastructure services are 
available to the relocation site 
(Imura & Shaw, 2009) 
Yes The relocation site was adjacent to the existing 
town and remained in the local school catchment 
(QRA, 2011).  Flooding caused major 
infrastructure damage in the LVRC. 
Infrastructure was built to a higher standard at 
the new site (e.g. roads, installation of sewerage).  
Betterment was a strategy employed to provide 
incentives to citizens to relocate.  It also added 
value to the other residents of Grantham.  
9. Relocation site is socially and 
economically suitable (Imura & 
Shaw, 2009) 
Yes Yes because it is located in close proximity to 
the existing community (Simmonds & Davies, 
2011). 
10. The social and personal needs of 
the relocated are addressed and 
social networks are preserved 
(Imura & Shaw, 2009; Perry & 
Lindell, 1997) 
Yes People received disaster assistance and assets 
were temporarily housed after floods (QRA & 
World Bank, 2011).  The new site was selected 
to meet the social and personal needs of the flood 
victims and was physically connected to the old 
site1.  It’s location preserved the social networks 
within Grantham and it is connected to the old 
part of Grantham via roads and sewerage 
networks (QRA, 2011). Most (75 percent) of 
people received their 1st-3rd preferences in the 
land swap ballot.  Goods and services were 
donated to flood victims and community service 
organizations and the LVRC provided critical 
support to affected residents.    
11. Housing designs, settlement 
layouts, natural habitat, and 
community facilities match a 
community’s way of life (Imura 
& Shaw, 2009) 
Yes Lot sizes were designed to match pre-existing 
sizes and residents were involved in the planning 
of the new settlement. The natural habitat is 
similar to the old location and the new 
development includes a park with a range of 
facilities and a convenience shop.  
																																																								
1	There were some residents relocated from other parts of the Lockyer Valley so their experiences with respect to this principle were 
different in terms of preserving social networks.	
12. People are able to bring items of 
high emotional, spiritual, or 
cultural value (Imura & Shaw, 
2009) 
Yes People were able to take what they wanted.  
Roads and rail crossings were constructed to 
allow entire houses to be transported to the new 
site. 
13. Commitment to relocation, the 
vision and rationale is set soon 
after the disaster, is time-bound, 
and strongly supported by the 
chief decision makers at all 
relevant tiers of government. 
Yes The goal was to have residents in their homes by 
Christmas.  This was set soon after the 
devastating floods and championed by the LVRC 
Mayor.  It received bi-partisan support from the 
Premier and Prime Minister.  Initially the 
community was divided about rebuilding, but 
this changed once a site was found that was safe 
that allowed residents to stay in their community 
(Simmonds & Davies, 2011). Pressure to achieve 
the goal was also championed by the media. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
		
Figure 3. Entrance to Grantham Relocation Area 
	
	
	 	
		
Figure 4. New and Relocated Houses in the Grantham Relocation Area 
	
	
	
	
 
 
